Abstract-Last few years, many security schemes are designed for RFID system since the release of the EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standard. In 2010, Yeh et al. proposed a new RFID authentication protocol conforming to EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standard. Yoon pointed that their protocol still had two serious security problems such as DATA integrity problem and forward secrecy problem. Then he proposed an improved protocol which claimed to eliminate the weakness in 2011. This paper shows that Yoon' s protocol had no resistance to replay attack and did not resolve the problem of data forge and tag's location privacy. An improved protocol is also proposed to protect RFID system from all major attacks. By comparing to other authentication protocols with respect of security and performance, the results shows that the proposed protocol is feasible for RFID tags which are low cost and resourceconstrained devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a mature information sensing technology, Radio frequency identification (RFID) has played an important role in the Internet of Things and pervasive computing environment. The RFID system consists of three elements: RFID tags, readers and back-end database server. The reader first exchanges information with a tag via radio transmission and requests to access the data about this tag, and after some certification process are executed among the three parties, the reader can retrieve the corresponding record from the database of the backend server [1] .
While a lot of new standards of RFID are designed by some organizations and enterprises, EPC-C1G2(the Electronic Product Code Class-1 Generation-2 specification) which is adopted by EPCGlobal in 2004 [2] is widely used in many fields such as logistics industry and retail business [3] . EPC-C1G2 is a new generation standard for passive tags which have limited computation and memory capacity due to their cost constraint on implementation [4] . However, the EPC-C1G2 does not take much account on the security and privacy issue about RFID system. So how to design a security protocol conforming to EPC-C1G2 for RFID system has been the focus of the research domain, which is also our concern in this paper.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: the related work is reviewed in Section 2. We briefly review Yoon's protocol in section3 and suggest the security problems on Yoon's protocol in Section 4. The new proposed protocol is presented in Section 5, and in Section 6 we analyze the proposed protocol with respect of security and the performance. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK

Motivated
by the release of EPC-C1G2 specification [5] , some researchers have recently proposed a lot of schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] trying to solve the practical problems due to the fact that the EPC-C1G2 only provides a low security level. In this section, we will summarize some related proposals in this field.
In 2007 Chien et al. [12] proposed a mutual authentication protocol conforming to EPC-C1G2 standard, the security of their scheme heavily relied on the abuse of the cyclic redundancy code (CRC). However, Peris-Lopez et al. [13] showed that the protocol cannot resist to tag impersonation, desynchronization attacking and location tracking. So the Chien et al.'s protocol not only is vulnerable to such attacks, but also does not provide tag privacy.
Chen and Deng [14] proposed an EPC-friendly mutual authentication scheme by using a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and CRC which is conformed to the EPC-C1G2 standard. Their protocol tried to apply CRC as cryptographic hash function for message authentication. However, CRC functions are linear and should not be used for any cryptographic purpose-only for detection of random errors in the channel [15] . So attacker is able to impersonate a tag or a reader, to trace a tag, and even to launch a DoS attack. These security vulnerabilities are all due to the misuse of the CRC function.
In 2009 Yeh et al. [16] also proposed a RFID mutual authentication protocol conforming to EPC-C1G2 standard which allows us free from the assumption of the channel's security. The information transmitted between reader and back-end database may also eavesdropped and intercepted by the attacker in actual environment, so the protocol applied a one-way hash function to guarantee the communication security between reader and back-end database. Nevertheless, Yoon [17] pointed out that Yeh et al.'s protocol still had two serious security problems such as DATA integrity problem and forward secrecy problem.
The most recent proposal is Yoon's protocol which claimed that it was free from weakness mentioned above. The protocol revised the forward secrecy problem and increased a message authentication code to check the integrity of the data transmitted between database and reader based on the Yeh et al.'s protocol. However, the improved protocol cannot resist the replay attack and did not solve the DATA integrity problem.
III. REVIEW OF YOON'S PROTOCOL
In this section we briefly review Yoon's protocol [17] . Notations used in this paper are defined as follows:
The 96 bits of EPC code are divided into six 16-bit blocks, and then the six blocks are XORed to get EPCs.
DATA : The corresponding record for the tag kept in the database. Yoon's protocol consists of two phases: the initialization phase, and the (i + 1)th authentication phase.
A. Initialization Phase
In this phase, some initial information such as 0 
B. The Detailed Steps of Yoon's Protocol
The communication messages exchanged are presented as follows:
Step 1. Reader → Tag: The reader generates random number R N as a challenge and forwards it to the tag.
Step 2. Tag → Reader: After receiving R N , the tag generates random number
back to the reader.
Step 3. Reader → Database: The reader computes ) (
Step 4. Database → Reader: After receiving ) , , , , , 
IV. WEAKNESSES OF YOON'S PROTOCOL
Yoon analyzed Yeh et al.'s protocol and pointed out that their scheme had two serious weaknesses: data integrity problem and forward secrecy problem. Then Yoon proposed a revised protocol and claimed that the new protocol resolved the security problems. This section shows that Yoon's protocol still has the following two security problems.
A. Replay Attack and Privacy Problem
In Yoon's security analysis, he claimed that the improved protocol can resist replay attack and had no privacy problem. However, we will show that the revised protocol is also vulnerable to replay attack and the tag may be traced down by the adversary. An adversary A can perform operations as follows:
(1) After finishing a successful authentication procedure among the three parties, the adversary A can collect and record the authentication message including ) , , , , ,
The adversary A pretends to play as a reader and resends the message ) , , , , ,
which is collected previously to the database. After receiving the message, the database will identify the reader and verify whether the authentication message is match to the record. This authentication procedure must be passed because the message ) , , , , ,
is legitimate.
(3) When the database completes the authentication of reader and tag, the message ) , , ( 2 MAC Info M is computed and sends to the reader. The message is identical to last one and it is no doubt that the tag will accomplish the validation to reader.
It is obvious that neither of tag and database has a mechanism which can detect the replay message. So the improved protocol has no resistance to the replay attack described above. On the other hand, the value ) ( RID DATA Info ⊕ = which is transmitted in step 4 is still at every round of authentication. So the adversary A can track the tag by discerning the value of Info . It means that Yoon's protocol cannot provide the tag's location privacy either.
B. DATA Integrity Problem
In Yeh et al.'s protocol, they assumed that the channel between reader and database was not secure. So the DATA between the database and reader can be spoofed or modified by an adversary A. Yeh 
V. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
We will propose an improvement of the Yoon's protocol which can resolve the problems presented in last section. The information kept within respective devices is same as Yoon's protocol. In addition, the initialization phase is identical as in the Yoon's protocol. We increase a timestamp t in order to resist to the replay attack. Fig. 2 illustrates the detailed steps of protocol. The messages exchanged are presented as follows:
Step 1. Reader → Tag: This step is the same as Yoon's protocol.
Step 2. Tag → Reader: This step is the same as Yoon's protocol.
Step 3. Reader → Database: The reader computes
, and then forwards ) , , , , , ,
to the database.
Step 4. Database → Reader: After receiving ) , , , , , ,
, the database performs the following operations:
(a)The database checks the timestamp t in order to exclude the possibility of replay message. If
, which means the difference between t and system time T is beyond the maximum extent t Δ , then the message will be discarded by database and the authentication operation will stop. Otherwise database retrieves each Then the database will verify 1 M , which is received from the reader, to see whether it is equal to M to the tag.
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Step 6. This step is the same as Yoon's protocol. Figure 2 . the detailed steps of proposed protocol.
VI. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we will discuss our proposed protocol with respect of security and performance. As previous shown, Yoon's protocol is vulnerable to replay attack and still has the privacy and data integrity problem. So in our design, we will show how our improved protocol eliminates the two weaknesses while preserving the security and performance level of original protocol. Theorem 1. The improved protocol withstands the replay attack and privacy problem.
Proof. Suppose adversary A collects and records the authentication message including
by eavesdropping the communication channel after a successful authentication. Then A resends the message ) , , , , , ,
to the database attempting to finish the authentication operation. However, the database will check the timestamp first and see whether the difference between t and system time T is beyond the maximum extent t Δ . This mechanism can get rid of the possibility of replay attack. On the other hand, the
which is transmitted in step 4 is also protected by the timestamp t . The adversary cannot trace down the tag anymore because the value of Info will not same at every round of protocol.
Therefore, it is obvious that our protocol can withstand the replay attack and privacy problem.
Theorem 2.The improved protocol resolve the data integrity problem. of previous session, however, it makes no sense to forge the value of V and MAC for adversary. It is true because both the V and MAC are protected by timestamp t . As a result, the improved protocol can resolve the data integrity problem.
Theorem 3. The improved protocol provides same performance like Yoon's protocol.
Proof. The main difference between our protocol and Yoon's is that the we use timestamp to computer the value of V , Info and MAC .The other steps of protocol are the same as Yoon's protocol. Therefore, the improved protocol still provides same performance like Yoon's protocol.
As shown in the Table 1 , we compare our proposed protocol with the protocols introduced previously with respect of security and performance. It is clear that our proposed protocol is not only resistance to all kinds of attacks, but also provides good performance. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The release of EPC-C1G2 standard signals a milestone for the RFID technology. Many schemes are proposed in order to enhance the security of EPC system. However, neither of them is proven to be completely safe. This paper demonstrates that Yoon's protocol still has DATA integrity problem and cannot resist to the replay attack unlike their claims and we present an improved protocol which avoids the security deficiencies of Yoon's protocol. A comparison of the security and performance is also made with other schemes, the result shows that the proposed protocol offers a better security level and is feasible for the EPC-C1G2 compliant systems.
